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Abstract—In this work, we consider a distributed wireless
network where many transmitters communicate with a com-
mon receiver. Having the choice of their power control policy,
transmitters are concerned with energy constraints : instanta-
neous energy-efficiency and long-term energy consumption. The
individual optimization of the average energy-efficient utility
over a finite horizon is studied by using control theory and a
coupled system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming equations
is obtained. Even though the existence of a solution to the
corresponding stochastic differential game is proven, the game is
difficult to analyze when the number of transmitters is large (in
particular, the Nash equilibrium analysis becomes hard and even
impossible). But when the number of transmitters is large, the
stochastic differential game converges to a mean-field game which
is ruled by a more tractable system of equations. A condition for
the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the mean-field game is given.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power control has always been recognized as an important
problem for multiuser communications [1], [2]. With the
appearance of new paradigms such as ad hoc networks [3],
unlicensed band communications, and cognitive radio [4], [5],
designing distributed power control policies has become espe-
cially relevant; in such networks, terminals can freely choose
their power control policies and do not need to follow orders
from central nodes. More recently, the need for building green
communication networks has appeared to be stronger and
stronger [6]. The goal is to manage energy consumption both at
the mobile terminals and network infrastructure sides [7]. The
work reported in this paper precisely falls into this framework
that is, the design of green distributed power control policies
in multiuser networks.
More precisely, we consider a network which comprises
many transmitters and one receiver. Each transmitter chooses
its power control policy in order to maximize its average
energy-efficiency (measured in bit per Joule). Note that a
similar framework was analyzed in [8]. In [8], the problem
is modeled by a static game: for each transmission block,
the transmitters choose their power levels strategically but
independently from past blocks. In [9], it has been shown
that much more efficient control policies can be obtained by
exploiting long-term interactions, which is done by using the
models of repeated games. But, as the channel gains associated
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with the different communication links vary over time, there
is generally a loss of optimality when using repeated games.
Indeed, in [10], [11], it is shown that the model of stochastic
games is more appropriate and can lead to better policies. The
problem is that, even though some special ad hoc policies can
be found [11], stochastic games are not fully characterized
in general; in particular, Folk theorems are only available in
special cases. Additionally, the problem of characterizing the
performance of distributed networks modeled by stochastic
games becomes very hard and even impossible when the
number of players becomes large. The same statement holds
for determining individually control strategies. This is where
mean-field games come into play. Mean-field games [12]
represent a way of approximating a stochastic differential (or
difference) game, by a much more tractable model. Typically,
instead of depending of the actions and states of all the players,
the mean-field utility of a player only depends on its own
action and state, and depends on the others through a mean-
field. It seems that the only work where mean-field games has
been used for power control is [13]. Compared to the latter
reference, the present work is characterized by a different
utility function (no linear quadratic control assumptions is
made here), the fact that the battery level of a transmitter is
considered as part of a terminal state, and the existence and
uniqueness analysis for of mean-field equilibria is conducted.
This article is organized as follows. In Section II, the
wireless context is described and we explain how we model
our problem with a stochastic differential game. In Section III,
the convergence of this stochastic differential game to a mean-
field game is proven and a condition for the uniqueness of
the solution to this game is given. Finally, in Section IV we
conclude this work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Wireless context
In a wireless network depicted by Fig.1 with a set of
transmitters
𝒩 = {1, . . . , 𝑛} and one receiver, the received signal is
𝑦(𝑡) =
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
ℎ𝑖(𝑡)𝑎𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑧(𝑡) (1)
with ℎ𝑖(𝑡) ∈ ℂ the channel coefficient between transmitter 𝑖
and the receiver at time 𝑡, 𝑎𝑖(𝑡) the symbols sequence sent by
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Figure 1. System model.
transmitter 𝑖 during time-slot 𝑡 and 𝑧(𝑡) is a Gaussian noise
with variance 𝜎2. We denote 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = ∣𝑎𝑖(𝑡)∣2 the transmitting
power of transmitter 𝑖 during time-slot 𝑡.
As we consider that transmitters are concerned about their
transmission rate but also about the energy they spend to
reach this rate, we use energy-efficient utility as introduced
by Mandayam and Goodman [8] : for each transmitter, the
instantaneous utility is
𝑢𝑖(𝑝(𝑡), ℎ(𝑡)) =
𝑅𝑓(𝛾𝑖(𝑝(𝑡), ℎ(𝑡)))
𝑝𝑖(𝑡)
(2)
where 𝑅 in bits/s is the transmitting rate of transmitter 𝑖
(as we do not use this rate as a control in our work, we
consider that it is constant for all the transmitters), 𝛾𝑖 is
the 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 of transmitter 𝑖, 𝑝(𝑡) = (𝑝1(𝑡), . . . , 𝑝𝑛(𝑡)) and
ℎ(𝑡) = (ℎ1(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑛(𝑡)). 𝑓 is an efficiency function which
represents the transmission success rate at the receiver. It takes
its values in [0, 1] and depends on the 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 of transmitter 𝑖.
More details about 𝑓 can be found in [8]. The 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 writes
𝛾𝑖(𝑝(𝑡), ℎ(𝑡)) =
𝑝𝑖(𝑡)∣ℎ𝑖(𝑡)∣2∑𝑛
𝑗 ∕=𝑖 𝑝𝑗(𝑡)∣ℎ𝑗(𝑡)∣2 + 𝜎2
, (3)
with ∣ℎ𝑖(𝑡)∣2 the channel gain between transmitter 𝑖 and the
receiver.
B. Evolution laws of the system
Depending on time, two parameters of the considered model
vary. These are the energy left at transmitter and the channel
coefficients between the transmitter and the receiver.
First, we consider that the manufacturer of the mobile
transmitter wants its device to be able to transmit during a
finite horizon which represents the desired battery life. We
denote 𝐸0 the initial available energy for each transmitter. The
dynamics of 𝐸𝑖(𝑡), the energy left for transmitter 𝑖 at time 𝑡, is
directly linked to the transmitting power through the following
deterministic law
d𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = −𝑝𝑖(𝑡)d𝑡. (4)
Secondly, we consider that for each transmitter the dynamics
of its channel coefficients is a Wiener process, meaning that
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩
dℎ𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜂d𝕎𝑖(𝑡) (5)
where ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , 𝕎𝑖(𝑡) are mutually independent Wiener pro-
cesses of dimension 2 and 𝜂 is the variance of ℎ𝑖 (𝜂 < +∞).
Contrary to the evolution of the energy left at the transmitter,
the channel coefficients evolve according to a stochastic law.
C. A stochastic differential game
It is assumed that each transmitter wants to maximize its
utility during a finite horizon 𝑇 → 𝑇 ′ while taking into
account the dynamics of the system, then the problem can
be written ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩
𝑣𝑖(𝑇 ) = sup
𝑝𝑖(𝑇→𝑇 ′)
𝔼
[∫ 𝑇 ′
𝑇
𝑢𝑖(𝑝(𝑡), ℎ(𝑡))d𝑡+ 𝑞(𝐸(𝑇 ′), ℎ(𝑇 ′))
]
dℎ𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜂d𝕎𝑖(𝑡)
d𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = −𝑝𝑖(𝑡)d𝑡
(6)
where 𝑣𝑖(𝑇 ) is the Bellman function, the expectation of the
continuous sum of utility for the optimal control path, 𝐸(𝑡) =
(𝐸1(𝑡), . . . , 𝐸𝑛(𝑡)), and 𝑞(𝐸(𝑇 ′), ℎ(𝑇 ′)) is the instantaneous
utility value for the final state.
We denote 𝑋(𝑡) = (𝐸(𝑡), ℎ(𝑡))T the state of the system at
time 𝑡. Then
d𝑋(𝑡) = (−𝑝(𝑡)d𝑡, 𝜂d𝕎(𝑡))T, (7)
with 𝕎(𝑡) a 2𝑛-dimension Wiener process. (6) can be rewrit-
ten
𝑣𝑖(𝑇,𝑋) = sup
𝑝𝑖(𝑇→𝑇 ′)
𝔼
[∫ 𝑇 ′
𝑇
𝑢𝑖(𝑋(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡))d𝑡+ 𝑞(𝑋(𝑇 ′))
]
d𝑋(𝑡) = (−𝑝(𝑡)d𝑡, 𝜂𝕎𝑡)T
(8)
If 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) is now considered as a feedback control
𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)), (9)
we are exactly in the context of a stochastic differential game.
D. Existence of a Nash equilibrium to the stochastic differen-
tial game
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium of the stochastic differential
game). A power profile
𝑝∗(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)) = (𝑝∗1(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)), . . . , 𝑝
∗
𝑛(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))
is a Nash equilibrium of the stochastic differential game if
and only if ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛}, 𝑝∗𝑖 is the optimal feedback for
the control problem
sup
𝑝𝑖(𝑇→𝑇 ′)
𝔼
[∫ 𝑇 ′
𝑇
𝑢𝑖(𝑋(𝑡), 𝑝𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)), 𝑝
∗
−𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)))d𝑡+𝑞(𝑋(𝑇
′))
]
(10)
where
𝑝∗−𝑖(.) =
(
𝑝∗1(.), . . . , 𝑝
∗
𝑖−1(.), 𝑝
∗
𝑖+1(.), . . . , 𝑝
∗
𝑛(.)
)
. (11)
According to [14], a sufficient condition for the existence
of a Nash equilibrium for the stochastic differential game is
the existence of a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-
Fleming [15] equation for each transmitter
0 = sup
𝑝𝑖(𝑇→𝑇 ′)
[
𝑢𝑖(𝑋(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)))− 𝑝𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))∂𝐸𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))
]
+∂𝑡𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)) +
𝜂2
2
∂2ℎℎ𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)).
(12)
with ∂𝑦𝐹 and ∂2𝑦𝑦𝐹 respectively being the first order and the
second order partial derivative of function 𝐹 with regard to 𝑦{
∂𝑦𝐹 =
∂𝐹
∂𝑦
∂2𝑦𝑦𝐹 =
∂2𝐹
∂𝑦2
However there exists a solution if the function
𝐻(𝑋(𝑡), 𝑝−𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)), ∂𝐸𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))) =
sup
𝑝𝑖(𝑇→𝑇 ′)
[
𝑢𝑖(𝑋(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)))− 𝑝𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))∂𝐸𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))
]
(13)
is smooth (see [16] for more details). And with a similar
reasoning as in [17], we can show that finding optimal power
profiles
𝑝∗(𝑇 → 𝑇 ′) = (𝑝∗1(𝑇 → 𝑇 ′), . . . , 𝑝∗𝑛(𝑇 → 𝑇 ′)) (14)
such that ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , 𝑝∗𝑖 (𝑇 → 𝑇 ′) ∈
arg max
𝑝𝑖(𝑇→𝑇 ′)
[
𝑢𝑖(𝑋(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)))− 𝑝𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))∂𝐸𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))
]
(15)
requires to solve ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 , ∀𝑡 ∈ [𝑇, 𝑇 ′]
𝑓 ′(𝛾𝑖(𝑡))𝛾𝑖(𝑡)−𝑓(𝛾𝑖(𝑡))=𝛾𝑖(𝑡)2
∂𝐸𝑖
𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)
𝑅
(
𝜎2+
∑𝑛
𝑗 ∕=𝑖 ∣ℎ𝑗 ∣
2(𝑡)𝑝∗𝑗 (𝑡)
∣ℎ𝑖∣2(𝑡)
)2
(16)
Note that we consider that ∂𝐸𝑖𝑉𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡)) ≥ 0, otherwise the
optimal power 𝑝∗𝑖 (𝑡) → ∞. In other words, we consider that
the more energy we have in our battery, the better the payoff
can be.
The existence of a non-zero solution depends on the term
𝛽𝑖 =
∂𝐸𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡,𝑋(𝑡))
𝑅
(
𝜎2 +
∑𝑛
𝑗 ∕=𝑖 ∣ℎ𝑗 ∣2(𝑡)𝑝∗𝑗 (𝑡)
∣ℎ𝑖∣2(𝑡)
)2
. (17)
Heuristically, we can see that there exists a threshold 𝛽max
such that if 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽max, there exists a unique global maximizer
𝛾∗ different from 0 and if 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 𝛽max, 0 is the global
maximizer. It is interesting to note that 𝛽𝑖 being proportional
to the interference of transmitter 𝑖, we can state that when
the interference conditions of transmitter 𝑖 are favorable,
transmitter 𝑖 should transmit whereas when the conditions are
bad, it should not waste transmitting power.
This behavior is illustrated on Fig.2, where the considered
efficiency function is
𝑓(𝛾𝑖(𝑡)) =
{
𝑒
− 𝑎
𝛾𝑖(𝑡) if 𝛾𝑖(𝑡) > 0,
0 if 𝛾𝑖(𝑡) = 0.
(18)
an efficiency function introduced by Belmega et al. in [18]. In
this simulation 𝑎 = 1.
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Figure 2. Instantaneous global maximizer depending on 𝛽.
In order to use the implicit function theorem, we define
𝑔 : [0, 𝛽max[×ℝ+ → ℝ
(𝛽, 𝛾)→ 𝑓 ′(𝛾)𝛾 − 𝑓(𝛾)− 𝛽𝛾2. (19)
𝑔 is 𝐶∞, then if 𝑔(𝛽0, 𝛾0) = 0, there exists 𝜑 : ℝ→ ℝ such
that 𝛾0 = 𝜑(𝛽0). 𝜑 is 𝐶∞ and
∂𝜑
∂𝛽
(𝛽0) = −
∂𝑔(𝛽0,𝛾0)
∂𝛽
∂𝑔(𝛽0,𝛾0)
∂𝛾
(20)
III. CONVERGENCE OF THE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL
POWER CONTROL GAME TO A MEAN-FIELD GAME
The previous system of equations is hard to solve because
for each transmitter, the associated partial differential equation
depends on all the channel coefficients and all the power
profiles of the other transmitters. Of course, if the number
of transmitters in the system increases greatly, it is true
that the complexity of the resolution increases as well. But
an interesting fact is that if the number of transmitters is
large enough, then for one single transmitter point of view,
it becomes equivalent to consider all the other transmitters
as a continuum. Therefore only the distribution of the other
transmitters states is needed for one transmitter to take into
account the other transmitters, which highly simplifies the
formulation of the problem. This is what is developed in the
present section.
Naturally, in a MAC network, the interaction between the
different transmitters is expressed in the interference term.
If we consider that CDMA is used in the network, then the
interference seen by the receiver is
𝐼𝑖(𝑡) =
1
𝑛− 1
𝑛∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑖
𝑝𝑗(𝑡)∣ℎ𝑗(𝑡)∣2. (21)
We consider homogeneous admissible control in own state
feedback form ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩
𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡)), (22)
with 𝑠𝑖(𝑡) = (ℎ𝑖(𝑡), 𝐸𝑖(𝑡))T the own state of transmitter 𝑖and
𝔼[𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡))
2] < +∞. Then
𝐼𝑖(𝑡) =
1
𝑛− 1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑛∑
𝑗 ∕=𝑖
𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑗(𝑡))∣ℎ𝑗(𝑡)∣2
=
𝑛
𝑛− 1
1
𝑛
[ 𝑛∑
𝑗=1
𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑗(𝑡))∣ℎ𝑗(𝑡)∣2 − 𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡))∣ℎ𝑖(𝑡)∣2
]
=
𝑛
𝑛− 1
∫
∣ℎ∣2𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠)𝑀𝑛𝑡 (d𝑠)
−𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡))∣ℎ𝑖(𝑡)∣
2
𝑛− 1
=
𝑛
𝑛− 1𝐴
𝑛
𝑡 −
1
𝑛− 1𝐵
𝑖
𝑡.
(23)
with
𝑀𝑛𝑡 =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑
𝑗=1
𝛿𝑠𝑗(𝑡), (24)
𝐴𝑛𝑡 =
∫
∣ℎ∣2𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠)𝑀𝑛𝑡 (d𝑠), (25)
𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡))∣ℎ𝑖(𝑡)∣2. (26)
If the number of transmitters becomes very large (𝑛→∞),
we can consider that we have a continuum of transmitters. The
convergence of the interference term when 𝑛 → ∞ needs to
be proven. Using admissible control, 𝔼[𝐵𝑖𝑡] <∞, then
lim
𝑛→∞
𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝑛− 1 = 0. (27)
As lim𝑛→∞ 𝑛𝑛−1 = 1, to prove 𝐼𝑖(𝑡) converges weakly, it
suffices to prove 𝐴𝑛𝑡 converge weakly. A sufficient condition
is the weak convergence of the process 𝑀𝑛𝑡 . As stated by
Kotelenez and Kurtz in [19], if the states and the controls are
almost surely bounded and the (𝑠𝑗(0)) are exchangeable, then
there exists a distribution 𝑚𝑡 such that
𝑚𝑡 = lim
𝑛→∞𝑀
𝑛
𝑡 . (28)
However in our case, the evolution of the state of the trans-
mitters does not depend on the index of the transmitter since
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 {
d𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = −𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡))d𝑡
dℎ𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜂d𝕎𝑡
(29)
Then, we set
𝐼(𝑡,𝑚𝑡) =
∫
∣ℎ∣2𝛼(𝑡, 𝑠)𝑚𝑡(d𝑠), (30)
𝛾(𝑠(𝑡),𝑚𝑡) =
𝑝(𝑡)∣ℎ(𝑡)∣2
𝜎2 + 𝐼(𝑡,𝑚𝑡)
, (31)
?ˆ?(𝑡) =
𝑅𝑓(𝛾(𝑠(𝑡),𝑚𝑡))
𝑝(𝑡)
=: 𝑟(𝑠(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡),𝑚𝑡). (32)
And we can formulate the mean-field response problem
𝑣𝑇 = sup
𝑝(𝑇→𝑇 ′)
𝔼
[
𝑞(𝑠(𝑇 ′)) +
∫ 𝑇 ′
𝑇
𝑟(𝑠(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡),𝑚∗𝑡 )d𝑡
]
(33)
where 𝑚∗𝑡 is the mean-field optimal trajectory, 𝑚∗0 being
assumed to be known and
d𝑠(𝑡) = (−𝑝(𝑡)d𝑡, 𝜂d𝕎(𝑡))T, (34)
A solution of the mean-field response problem is a solution
of
{
−∂𝑡𝑣𝑡 = ?˜?(𝑠(𝑡), ∂𝐸𝑣𝑡,𝑚𝑡) + 𝜂
2
2 ∂
2
ℎℎ𝑣𝑡
∂𝑡𝑚𝑡 + ∂𝐸(𝑚𝑡∂𝑢?˜?(𝑠(𝑡), ∂𝐸𝑣𝑡,𝑚𝑡)) =
𝜂2
2 ∂
2
ℎℎ𝑚𝑡
(35)
with 𝑣𝑇 = 𝑞(𝑠(𝑇 )) and 𝑚0 known and
?˜?(𝑠, 𝑢,𝑚) = sup
𝑝
{𝑟(𝑠, 𝑝,𝑚) + ⟨𝑝,−𝑢⟩} (36)
As for the stochastic differential game case, the first equa-
tion is a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Flemming equation. But it
is now coupled with a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation.
The former one is a backward equation whereas the latter one
is a forward equation.
Similarly to section II-D, expressing ?˜?(𝑠(𝑡), ∂𝐸𝑣𝑡,𝑚𝑡)
requires to solve
𝛾𝑓 ′(𝛾)− 𝑓(𝛾) = 𝛽𝛾2 (37)
with
𝛽 =
∂𝐸𝑣𝑡
𝑅
(𝜎2 + 𝐼𝑖(𝑡,𝑚𝑡))
2
∣ℎ𝑖∣4 (38)
If there exists a solution different from zero, we denote
𝛾∗(𝑠(𝑡), ∂𝐸𝑣𝑡,𝑚𝑡) this solution. With the parameters pre-
viously defined, we can derive a sufficient condition for
uniqueness of the solution to the system of coupled equations
(35). The proof is not given here.
Proposition 1 (Uniqueness of a solution). A sufficient condi-
tion for a solution of the solution to the mean-field game to
be unique is ∀𝑠,∀∂𝐸𝑣, ∀𝑚
(𝑓 ′′(𝛾∗(𝑠, ∂𝐸𝑣,𝑚)− 2𝛽)𝑓 ′(𝛾∗(𝑠, ∂𝐸𝑣,𝑚))
+𝑚𝛾∗(𝑠, ∂𝐸𝑣,𝑚)2𝛽2 > 0
(39)
IV. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE
In a wireless model where the energy left for each trans-
mitters evolves according to the power spent to transmit and
the channel coefficients of these same transmitters evolve in
a stochastic manner, we have shown that the problem of
each transmitter maximizing the expectation of an energy-
efficient utility during a given time is equivalent to a stochastic
differential game. The existence of a Nash equilibrium for this
game has been proven. But as the resolution of the associated
system of partial differential equations is hard, especially
when the number of transmitter is high, we show that the
stochastic differential game converges to a mean-field game
which equilibrium is the solution of a system of two partial
differential equations: a backward Hamilton-Jacob-Bellman
equation and a forward Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation.
From a game theory point of view, this model highly simplifies
the complexity of the interactions between a large number of
players. A condition of uniqueness for the mean-field Nash
equilibrium is given.
Of course, our main objective now is to characterize the
mean-field equilibrium. This can be done numerically by im-
plementing solutions as described in the work of Achdou [20].
Then the efficiency of this solution could be compared to
equilibria obtained as solutions of simpler energy-efficient
power control models.
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